What if Israel held back in June of 1967 and the tensions tied down?
That war started a cascade of events that still shape the current Middle East. It is impossible to sort out all the various threads and counterfactual alternatives had the war not happened. The best we can do is focus on a few of the broader issues.
It is not fanciful to say that the war killed Nasser. Stress from dealing with the defeat, and its after effects, such as the 1970 “Black September” Jordanian civil war, shortened the life of the man. He passed away at 52, a very young age by the current standard of Middle Eastern autocrats. Where would Egypt, and the broader region, be if he lived to ripe old age, or even into his 60s. One possibility is that Nasser would have finally given in to Soviet pressure to move Egypt so close to its orbit as to be another Cuba. Nasser would be an aging Castro, and Cairo would sport traffic jams with 1950s American cars. Equally likely Nasser would have not given in, as his entire political and emotional persona was tied up with keeping “foreign” bases out of Egypt. An opening to the US would have been in the offing for a couple of reasons. First, the 1968 election in the US brought in Nixon; Henry Kissinger’s sponsor. The two men would have itched to deliver a strategic blow to the Soviet Union. Second, Nasser did not replace Zakaria Mohieddin (America’s man among the Free Officers) as Vice President until after the 1968 student riots. He brought in Sadat to appease the Islamists. Had Zakaria remained close to Nasser he would have likely pushed for better relations with America, and perhaps economic liberalization to offset the stagnation of the mid 1960s. There were also other forces at work. By 1967 Arabism was failing Nasser and tiring him. The Yemen conflict with Saudi Arabia was economically debilitating. The relations with Algeria, Iraq and Syria all had deteriorated. He had already made enemies of most of the other Arab countries. He was also fearful of any penetration of the Army by the Muslim Brotherhood. Without Arabism or Islamism to provide the outline of policy, Nasser was likely to fall back on the Egyptianism of the 1920s, with its deeply Anti-Arab sentiments. The closest actual historical parallel would be South Korea of the 1960s. Would authoritarian Egyptianism have been tamed into something resembling a liberal order? Perhaps, especially if an opening to the West occasioned liberalization of the economy.
What would have happened to Palestine had the West Bank remained in Jordanian hands? It is possible that King Hussein, ever the wily operator, would have moved to create a confederation that would ultimately result in a friendly Palestinian state, especially as Nasser’s Arabism cooled and the need to use the refugee issue against Israel lessened. It is also possible that the rising Palestinian population within Jordan would have de-stabilized the Hashemite Kingdom. In both cases, the Palestinian national aspirations would have found a better outcome.
Beyond Egypt and Palestine, the 1967 war helped the rise to power of a wily General by the name of Hafez Al Assad. If he remained an army man from a small Latakia clan, Syria would have evolved in a very different direction. The messy politics post union with Egypt would likely have taken a very Lebanese direction. Lebanon, in turn, could also have averted its civil war, which was the outcome of the increased Palestinian population in the country, and meddling by the Syrian regime.
And what of Israel? Where would the country be had it not won a major victory that boosted its pride, enlarged its borders and altered its politics. Would it have emerged as an economic powerhouse in the region anyway, or would the Labor party have kept it a narrowly socialist economy? Would the country have retained the left-of-center ethos of the early Zionists, or in time moved rightward anyway? What would be the evolution of an Israel; smaller, within less secure borders, less cocky and in the shadow of a less hostile Egypt?
But of course the 1967 war did happen. The last half century brought momentous changes to the region. Will the next half century be spent in reversing those changes, or ameliorating their effects? We may never know the answer, until June 4 2067.
— Maged Atiya
No two men could be more different than President Obama and GOP candidate Donald Trump. “Superego” and “Id” seem to have been invented to describe the two men. One is given to cerebral reflections and restrained behavior, the other to verbal emissions and tantrums. Yet remarkably when it comes to the Middle East, they seem to converge. The reader who doubts this should answer the following questions. Which of the two men complained about erstwhile Gulf allies as “free riders” or “they don’t pay their share”? Which of the two men called the Libyan engagement a “shit show” or “a disaster”? Which of the two men felt that Putin’s Russian adventure is Syria will “exhaust them” or “let them do the fighting”? Which of the two men confesses support for Israel but would like “to consider the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians” or “be even handed”?
As far as Middle East policy, the current US field of aspiring Presidents divides neatly into two camps. Those who echo the conventional wisdom of the “foreign policy establishment” and those who view its recommendations with deep suspicion and unease. Obama and Trump belong to the latter camp. To the mind of this observer this is an overdue correction. As a matter of empirical evidence, the US attempted a variety of policies in the region, and all came to bitter ends. It supported authoritarian leaders and revolutions and is left with the theoretical argument as which of these two groups are responsible for state collapse. It placed a massive army in Iraq to remove a hated dictator and democratize it. It did no such thing in Syria. It split the difference in Libya. It let allies handle the situation in Yemen. None of the above are examples of success. What is a super power to do with region that abhors both its involvement and indifference?
There is fatigue in the land with the intractable problems of the Middle East, and perhaps a desire to forget or ignore such problems. The Republic has been intimately involved with the region since its very founding. The involvement was always dual-natured and at times contradictory. The elite force of the US military, the Marines, was created in part to deal with the North African piracy. American missionaries, armed with the Protestant zeal and affection for the “Holy Land”, came to the region in the 1850s and built schools and universities that educated generations of intellectuals, journalists, and political leaders. Most exhibited a baffling combination of admiration, attraction, resentment, anger and hostility to America. The theorists of both Arabism and post-colonialism are closer to their American object of derision than to their own people. American soldiers and spies have been even less successful than teachers and preachers in building anything of lasting value. Most Americans are not well versed in the details of Middle East history and policy, but they do recognize a bad deal when they see one. Few are as upset by Obama’s distant shrug and are unlikely to be moved by arguments from the usual Middle East experts. Trump’s policy of a slammed door is harsh, yet more than a few are willing to give it a try. Middle East governments spend handsomely to affect American policy, and are likely to have a return as impressive as that of Jeb Bush’s donors. Whether good or bad, fair or unfair does not matter. While Obama and Trump advise these governments to take up the mantle and clean up the mess in their backyards, one suspects that they are unable and unwilling to do so.
There is no resolution or cure for this fatigue. Maybe it will pass, or maybe it will not. If the next President is from the “ignore them” camp then he will not pay a steep political price for that view. If the next President is from the “engaged and involved” camp, she will likely find no political rewards in that path. In that sense, Obama and Trump, in their very different ways, point to the future.
— Maged Atiya
The immigrant boy filled out the school enrollment forms in block letters. The form labeled “ESL” had a space for declaration of the native language. He left it vacant. It is tempting to paint a dramatic scene of a profession of faith where the boy declares English to be his true mother tongue and thrice insists “I do not know this language” about Arabic. But the reality was that he was simply eager to move on quietly. Many hands participated in this linguistic matricide, but chief among them was Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, who passed away a few days ago. Many have tried to locate Heikal as a journalist, or an opinion maker or a government official. He was all three, but mostly he was a writer of fiction made believable by his own fervid faith in it.
For a boy coming to grips with literacy in 1960s Egypt Al Ahram was required reading, and its editor, the aforementioned Heikal, held court several times a week with an opinion column. A memory, in a Proustian knock-off way, is of the smell of freshly baked cookies with date filling wafting from the neighbor’s apartment. The generous patriarch took a liking to the boy and often invited him to share. On the invariably sunny days of Egypt the man sat in the balcony reading Al Ahram and commenting on Heikal’s column with a red pencil. But that was Egypt then, and one could not be sure that a discarded newspaper will not be picked up by a Zabal who moonlighted for the secret police. So uncle Thabet made his comments in his own secret code; daggers, double crosses, circles with arrows and triangles with bars. Every edition was a palimpsest of Quotidian Egypt with the red cuneiforms of honestly felt views laid over the black print of the newspaper. And so it went as Arabic was inseparably linked to the lie called Arabism. Arabic became a language reflexively understood, reluctantly spoken and on occasions even harshly denounced.
A decade later the young college student trying to navigate the treacherous and alien currents of America’s 1970s experiment in all manners of freedom, both laudable and dangerous, still found time to obtain a copy of Al Ahram to jeer at Heikal’s column, only to leave unsatisfied. His opinions came out less frequently, and the new boss was a one-man theatrical troupe who needed no bard. It is embarrassing to say that when news of Heikal’s arrest came in the fall of 1981 one strove to think of him as an Edmond Dantes deprived of pen and paper and furtively writing on the cell walls with whatever implements or excretions on hand. In fact he was released quickly and continued to ply his trade with great energy and to great fame.
Obituaries for Heikal describe him, in one way or another, as Poet Laureate of Nasser world. But Heikal, who was a few years younger than Nasser, lived nearly twice as long. He had an entire lifetime to show otherwise, and failed to do so. We must then judge Nasser as the smiling enforcer of Heikal world. This author professes no attraction to eulogies, nor faith in the afterlife. But if there is an afterlife we must hope that Heikal is consigned to heaven, for there he will be condemned to the eternal company of those that the presumed creator has deemed to be truth tellers.
— Maged Atiya
“Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the French Republic, in Africa and in Asia, to the rightful heirs of Palestine – the unique nation of the Jews, who have been deprived of the land of your fathers by thousands of years of lust for conquest and tyranny, which even so has never been able to destroy your name of your existence as a nation ……
Rightful heirs of Palestine!
My great nation, which does not trade in human beings or in countries, as did those who sold your fathers into slavery in other nations, herewith calls upon you, not to conquer your inheritance, but to receive only that which has already been conquered, so that you can remain there as ruler, under our guarantee, and will defend it against all foreigners”(1)
Or so went the declaration by the Corsican General, not yet 30 years of age, allegedly made in Jerusalem on Passover day 1799. Historians have never been able to confirm the authenticity of this claim. The original declaration in French was never found, and Napoleon was never in Jerusalem. On the other hand, many other substantiating documents exist, including discussions in the Directory. There is, most famously, a German translation smuggled to England just prior to WWII, as the Viennese rabbinical family that owned it was set to escape Hitler. That has been alleged to be a forgery. In the 1950s and 1960s there was a rumor in Egypt that a Jewish family owned a Hebrew copy signed by Napoleon himself. But the source of the rumor could have been many of the Nazi fugitives who lived in Egypt then. Yet a number of historians have concluded that something like this document could have easily been in Napoleon’s mind as he marched from Egypt to punish the ruler of Acre, Ahmed Pasha Al Jazzar (The Butcher). The bloody and cantankerous man had smuggled an Ottoman firman to Egypt a few months prior which caused the Cairo riots of October 1798. Ahmed Pasha was known to be partial to sectarian killings, having started his reign in the Levant by sealing Christians into the walls of Beirut. When the French approached his walls he rounded up all the Christians of Acre, killed them and tossed their bodies over the wall. His reasons were not entirely murderous. The Christians, Jews, Druze and Shi’a of the Levant were collaborating with Napoleon in his effort to topple the Ottoman Empire. There is plenty of documented evidence that the French General promised small independent Cantons to all the diverse religious groups of the region. Napoleon landed in Egypt with a clear dream. He would build a new oriental empire on the ashes of the Ottoman shambles. Egypt would be its vanguard, Islam its ideology, and the Levant pacified by subdivision into vassal states. “Little Europe” was too small for him. A century before the Ottoman demise, the Frenchman had in mind a “post-Ottoman” order. Napoleon’s vision was a less democratic version of the nascent United States. A constellation of states which would emerge independently from a French culture, but still owe more than a passing resemblance to it. His dreams of an oriental empire faded before the walls of Acre, and as his army swept back to Egypt, a multitude of Levantine Christian refugees joined it to escape the revenge of the Butcher. The scene of the “Shawam” escaping the chaos of their homeland to Egypt would be repeated many times in the next two centuries. By a cruel irony, the French army entered Egypt on June 5 1799, and upon this occasion and on this date the great General declared his loss a victory.
There was another vision for the region, one rarely taken up by recent historians. It starts with an equally talented and remarkable, but lesser known, General Louis Desaix, Almost the same age as Napoleon, and possibly more original and daring. Desaix had all of Napoleon’s skill and energy, but little of his near mystical ambition and self-regard. He accompanied Napoleon on the expedition to Egypt, before dying in Italy in 1800. In late 1798 he set out from Cairo to chase one of the previous rulers of Egypt, Murad Bey, whom he had defeated at the battle of Imbaba. Desaix was to travel as far south as the first cataract, at the head of the first European army to do so since the Romans. The Mamlukes outnumbered and outgunned Desaix, and knew the country better. Yet he won every encounter with brilliant military tactics and the unswerving dedication and love of his troops. His feats of generalship remain little noted. It was during this campaign that he made the acquaintance of another remarkable man, Mu’allam Ya’qub. Ya’qub was Murad’s deputy and tax collector; not an unusual profession for a Copt at the time. Murad was “Sheik Al Hajj”, but it was Ya’qub who managed the complex task of organizing the caravans to Mecca, some from as far away as West Africa. It was Desaix who persuaded Ya’qub to switch sides, and he proved a great asset. He ran an intelligence network on the movements and location of the Mamluke armies. He sealed the Red Sea ports against the influx of warriors from Arabia, who flocked to the promise of killing infidels, but stayed to pillage Egyptians of all religions. Sometime between 1799 and 1801 Ya’qub cooked up a daring and wholly new idea; creating a nation-state out of Egypt, totally unconnected to any empire and lacking any affiliation to a larger Muslim or Arab identity. He formed a “Coptic Legion”, boarded a ship for Europe in 1801 to argue for an independant Egypt in the courts of Europe, but died soon after. His legion would distinguish itself in the Napoleonic wars and its descendants would continue to live in France to this day.
Ya’qub’s friend Desaix made three seminal contributions to Egypt, a country he seemed to like well-enough but without the hysterical passions of Napoleon. First he thinned the ranks of the Mamluke warlords and their militias, making it possible for Muhammad Ali to eradicate them a little more than a decade later. The credit for ridding Egypt of the vicious military caste that ruled over it for over 500 years and nearly brought total destruction on it, goes to both the French soldier and the Albanian Wali. Second, he brought forth a vision of governance unknown to Egyptians at the time. Napoleon enjoyed the title of “Al Sultan Al Kebir” (the Great Ruler), while the peasants of the countryside gave Desaix the title “Al Sultan Al ‘Adil” (The Just Ruler). Desaix’ vision of capable government and justice administered without regard to wealth or religion remains an elusive but inviting reality in today’s Egypt. Finally Desaix gave protection and support to many Savants, especially the artist Vivant Denon, who made the first reliable and extensive sketches of Egyptian antiquities. When he arrived back in Cairo in the heat of July 1799, the Savant could do little but speak of the greatness of what he saw and the fact that it preceded European civilization by centuries. In Denon and Ya’qub we detect the first stirrings of an Egyptian nationalism that held the nation to be an exceptional phenomenon, and the visible and indelible markings of religion and language as merely superficial aspects of a deeper essential self (2). That vision holds some promise but also a dark underbelly, and to this date it remains neither able to fulfill the promise nor capable of totally riding itself of its sense of injury and anger.
As the region remakes itself it is worth considering the lessons of more than two centuries ago, although we should gird ourselves for a likely disappointment.
— Maged Atiya
1- As collated by Paul Strathern in “Napoleon in Egypt”
2- Louis ‘Awad did much to revive Ya’qub’s reputation. Islamists are fond of pointing out his defense of the Coptic quarter of Cairo against the mob as evidence of his “sectarian agenda”.
No, not that one of 2011. The January revolution that comes to mind is that of 17-19 of January 1977. Thousands poured into the streets to protest the rise of subsidized bread prices. The police fled, and the panicked President asked the Army for help in quelling the chaos in Alexandria and parts of Cairo. If revolutions are to be measured by their results, then this was a profound and often forgotten event. Let us enumerate a few of its after effects.
Sadat in a panic over a lack of dividend for the impressive showing in the October 1973 war, and fearful of a US sponsored talk fest on peace in the Middle East, took matters into his own hand and eventually initiated direct talks with Israel. The result was an upending of the “Arab order” that still resonates to this day, in the hopelessness of building a Palestinian national state, the disintegration of the Levant and the rise of Saudi Arabia as the paranoid hegemon of the region.
The riots firmed Sadat’s desire to find allies among the Muslim Brotherhood. It was a fateful decision for him, and for the battered country he ruled. In the last days of his life he would realize the error of believing that the Brotherhood, and its allies, would seek anything less than the entire pie. That lesson seems to have been forgotten 34 years later, and with bloody consequences for the country.
The riots convinced the Egyptian political elites that subsidies for the poor were an evil necessity and can not be touched; the third rail of Egyptian politics, as it were. This conviction condemned the country to further three decades of authoritarian economic stagnation. Ironically, the attempt to reverse this in the decade before 2011 which was bearing some fruits in economic growth, came to an effective end in 2011.
Shortly after the events of 1977 Tahseen Bashir remarked that “Egypt is the only country in the Arab world, the rest are tribes with flags”. The son of Egyptian aristocracy was paraphrasing a widespread feeling among those of his class during the early 20th century. They believed there were only two civilizations in the region, Egyptian and Persian. The irony of today is that both countries continue to struggle with the demons of their nationalism and religion sapping their potential greatness, while the “tribes” have fragmented even further.
It is not quaint historicism to recall the January 1977 revolution, for the next revolution in Egypt is likely to resemble the 1977 events rather than the 2011.
— Maged Atiya
The suspension of Russian flights to Egypt will likely decimate tourism in the Red Sea. So why did Putin, who is idolized by many in Egypt, make that decision? It is possible that he is concerned about Russian lives, put at risk by lax airport security. It would be a welcome change from his heretofore attitude toward lives, both Russian and non-Russian. More likely Putin is using the crash of the Russian airliner as pretext to wrest something out of Egypt, as always for his gain. As a man well versed in Soviet history he must know something about the “Kosygin tactic”. The Soviet Union desired a naval base in Alexandria. From the beginning of the Yemen war in 1962 to the final departure of advisors in 1972 the man in charge of the policy, Alexei Kosygin, alternately provided aid and withheld it to coerce Nasser into providing the base. Nasser, and his fellow Free Officers, would not relent, if only because they built their reputation on keeping Egypt out of foreign alliances and keeping foreign bases out of Egypt. For that decade the Soviet Union approximated a frustrated High Schooler ineptly trying to unhook the well-clasped ample Egyptian bra. In the end it was an unlikely American, Henry Kissinger, who pulled a “Kosygin” on Kosygin, and cemented a relationship, now fraying. (Kosygin never recovered from that humiliation). Putin clearly wants something and is trying to coerce it out of Egypt. Perhaps it is mere influence, or something more substantial such as assistance with the various Middle Eastern escapades he is involved in.
Egypt today is a country at the end of its tether (more on that in a separate post). Like the proverbial animal in that pathetic situation it could lash out and act in an unpredictable fashion. But this denouement is an opportunity for the country to start anew and chart a better path. It is 1876 all over again in Egypt, but this time without either the rapacious European bankers or Lord Cromer. It is the end of the 1954 Nasser state (as 1876 was the end of the Muhammad Ali state). That state has reached a dead-end, where it can no longer sweet talk or coerce the citizens, and where it offers no vision beyond plodding along. Egypt needs an overhaul and reorganization of the state; its legitimacy and obligations to the citizens, defences, finances, administrative structures and relations with the region and the world. One suspects that many in power know that, but are unable to break the tether that binds them to the post of the 1954 state, and keeps the country just barely away from the peace and prosperity it desires. President Sisi expressed effusive gratitude to the US in September, both to the English and Arabic press. But the US kept a lofty distance, perhaps because it is no longer in a mood of “nation building and democratization”. Little more than a decade ago the US spent a Trillion Dollars and thousands of lives trying to build a democracy in so-called Iraq; a task as fanciful as growing Cranberries in the Sahara. With collapsing states all over the region the US is in no mood for a second go. That is a costly mistake. There are better ways to build nations than Paul Bremer and his merry crew of Heritage conservatives (hint – it involves capable natives). There are better ways a great power can assert its influence beyond raw military might (perhaps advice can be sought from the sage of Sutton Place, who pulled the first Kosygin). The US can finally cash in, on the cheap, on the bet it has so expensively made and now discarded. With Egypt almost entirely alone and friendless, the US can step in with a package of recommended administrative reforms and assistance to rebuild the shambling state and create a native example of what can work in the region. Egypt has been in recent times a regional example or a cautionary tale. It is unlikely that counter-productive Egyptian pride will accept a Cromer redux, so the manner of assistance must be clothed in acceptable forms. Several times in the recent months Egyptian officials asked for such “assistance” from Egyptians abroad, and even created a special ministry for “immigration”, headed by a woman. The feelers are all there, as they were in 1973. A great power should, like a real estate speculator, know when to step into a troubled neighborhood and buy on the cheap. Putin has spent several years tweaking the US in the Ukraine and Syria. It would be sweet to send him chasing his head, bare-chested, in the one place likely to matter greatly in the Middle East. And, as an added bonus, finally figure out a US policy in the region away from the failures and frustrations of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the slowly unfolding debacle of either embracing the Saudi monarchy or dancing with the Iranian Mullahs. But two critical questions remain; is the US in a mood to truly affect the Middle East for a better long term outcome, and does it have the diplomatic and cultural skills to do so?
— Maged Atiya
Einstein defined madness as repeating identical actions expecting different results. He also could have defined idiocy as the allocation of scarce resources toward irrelevant goals. The region around Egypt is rife with horrors born from the collapse of ineffective states. Respect by the citizens is central to an effective state. No one, however, respects an idiot. There is plenty of evidence that the state in Egypt is devolving to idiocy, especially since the events of January 2011. The anecdotal evidence is overwhelming. And the state of idiocy is not new.
When Nasser succeeded to the post of Prime Minister, then President, in 1954 he wanted to beautify the banks of the Nile near downtown Cairo, building a Corniche accessible to the common people; a laudable goal. Impatient with state bureaucracy, he trusted the task to a Free Officer, Abdel Latif Boghdadi. Two decades later, more of that story would emerge in a Church basement in the US through the words of an Egyptian immigrant. He was a fast rising young civil engineer when the project was proposed. He reviewed the plans and put a hold on granting the necessary permits. He had noticed the lack of proper drainage. His actions earned him the anger of Boghdadi, but ultimately he prevailed. The Corniche remained a lovely river walk well into the 1980s. The man’s career, however, suffered irreparably, thus causing his immigration. The recent floods in Alexandria are an eerie echo of those events. Pell Mell development drowned the city in rain due to improper drainage. A man who knows the city well commented that most of its state employees are “hapless Hanbalis, more worried about prayer schedules than drainage pipes”. Even worse, the young, dynamic, civilian and progressive governor, who had warned of this potential problem, was sacked. Egypt’s “Peter Principle” goes something like this “every capable man or woman will fall to the level of their worst expectations”.
Idiocy is evident in how mistakes are handled. The army incorrectly targets a convoy of tourists, killing a dozen, including Mexican nationals. This is no unusual event in the annals of counter-terrorism. The US Army, the best in the world, has done worse, including bombing a hospital in Afghanistan a few weeks after that event in Egypt. The idiot state flails for excuses and attempts to deflect blame through transparent lies. The intelligent state assumes responsibility and launches credible investigations to rectify the process and reduce future errors.
Idiocy is also evident in the manner by which the state defends itself against those who seek its destruction. Much effort is placed going after the lesser threats, wasting resources and credibility that should be invested countering more serious ones. When a judge denies medical treatment to a tearful young woman under administrative detention, he lessens himself and the system he serves. The state can not gain respect while appearing spiteful and petulant. Similarly, the prosecution of an American citizen, one Mohammad Soltan, was a classic case of idiocy. The young man is a clueless naif and unfortunate scion of bigotry. He bumbled into peripheral participation in what some called the “Rab’aa PR Project”, a euphemism for sectarian incitement. The smart response would be to deport the young man to obscurity in Rustbelt USA. Instead, the idiot state detained him and then released him, to wide acclaim by pundits and politicians in the West. They effectively made him the unlikely face of “Human Rights Violations” in Egypt.
Idiocy is a dangerous state among those with a modicum of power. It is sometimes difficult to tell who is a bigger danger to peaceful survival of the state; those who loudly proclaim the desire to destroy it, or those who ineptly offer to defend it. The trouble with the current situation is that most opponents of the state are bigger idiots. So how do we end this Jeremiad? We can begin by quoting the words of Emmanuel Abraham, an Ethiopian diplomat who spent decades smoothing the troubled relations between Egypt and Ethiopia. In 1995 he wrote “It seems to me that the modern people of Egypt, and especially that section which had a smattering of modern education and which in consequence has assumed the leadership of the common people, have abandoned the faith of their forefathers and have not fully grasped modern ideals and knowledge. They are like a man who goes out on a boat without oars.” It is good and well for people to insist that the Egyptian state becomes more democratic and “inclusive”, although this skeptical observer insists on an exact definition of what gets “included”. More importantly we should insist that the state advances its goals, even those we disagree with, intelligently. Those who want to bring democracy to Egypt might do well to start by bringing a pair of oars.
— Maged Atiya